This paper proposes a novel approach that applies neural network forecasting to security for closed-loop prepaid cards based on low-cost technologies such as RFID and 1-Wire. The security vulnerability of low-cost RFID closed-loop prepaid card systems originates mostly from the card itself. Criminal organizations counterfeit or clone card data. Although high-security prepaid cards exist, they are often too expensive for transport ticketing, and even their security is not guaranteed for a well-defined period of time. Therefore, data encryption systems are used widely against counterfeiting with success. However, it has not been possible to develop countermeasures with comparable success against cloning. Our proposed security application uses neural network forecasting to determine the recharge day behavioral characteristics of the cardholder and predict the next time the cardholder will recharge their card. Based on the prediction for the recharge time, the expiration date of the low-cost RFID prepaid card is defined, which is a good countermeasure against cloning. FTDNN, LRNN, and NARX network architectures with one hidden layer are considered in this research. The effects of the network architecture, the number of neurons, the training algorithm, and the prediction performance function on the recharge day forecast are investigated. Experimental results confirm the accuracy of the recharge time forecast and confirm countermeasures against cloning. Our proposed security approach with neural network forecasting is applied with success to the Turkish public transport without an online backend system.
Introduction
For the past several years, the use of prepaid cards with radio frequency identification (RFID) technology has grown rapidly as an alternative to credit and debit cards. The exponential growth of RFID prepaid cards brings not only prosperity but also vulnerability, especially for low-cost cards. These low-cost tags have little or no processing and storage capacity. Therefore, it is not possible to implement well-known cryptographic protocols such as 3DES (Triple-Data Encryption Standard) or AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) to increase the tag security. However, RFID cards with simple logical functions as cryptographic protocols are preferred for applications where many cards are needed, such as prepaid telephone cards and transit fare cards, because these cards are inexpensive. However, numerous attacks have challenged security mechanisms for low-cost RFID cards, such as Philips MIFARE RFID tags [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , Texas Instruments DST RFID tags [10] [11] [12] , and Maxim iButtons [13] . Furthermore, the unique serial number (UID) of a chip is initialized only by the manufacturer, but a China-based company produced unlicensed clones of MIFARE chips [7, 8] . Highly secure tags have greater processing and storage capabilities. Therefore, these cards are expensive, but they have the capability to be high-security tags. Certainly, a card's security is not guaranteed for a well-defined period of time. Kasper et al. [14] showed how to fully recover the 3DES key of a high security DESFire tag with a factory-programmed UID from MIFARE using side-channel analysis. Furthermore, Kasper et al. [15] could clone and restore the credit balance of a card to its original state to provide an infinite amount of payments with the high security DESFire tag with 3DES and a DESFire EV1 tag with AES from MIFARE. Although the security level of credit cards is extremely high because they use online backend systems to finish transactions, Murdoch et al. [16] found vulnerabilities in the security standard used to make payments without knowing the card's PIN and to remain undetected while using an online connection to the banking network. These security vulnerabilities show that security with cryptographic protocols is never sufficient to provide high security for tags, especially for a defined time period. The main sources of these security vulnerabilities are the unchangeable cryptographic protocols and authentications. Although it is important to secure a system the first time it is used, it is more important to have the ability to adapt to a higher security level if needed. However, this adaptability is not applicable to public systems where tags and readers must be reprogrammable, which requires a higher initial cost. Our proposed security approach fulfills this need with a completely different form of security, and it is suitable for applications with low-cost technologies, such as RFID and 1-Wire. Our proposed security approach depends on the time of recharge and the cardholder's behavioral characteristics, which are specific for each cardholder and function as a dynamic 'unique identifier' [17] . From these behavioral characteristics, we use neural network (NN) forecasting to predict the card expiration date as a countermeasure against cloning.
NN has been applied successfully as a powerful modeling technique in a wide range of research areas. NN refers to mathematical models based upon the functionality of the human brain. These models contain at least three different layers, input, hidden, and output, and each layer is composed of a number of neurons. NN models are increasingly applied to systems that are highly correlated and frequently assumed to be nonlinear, having unclear relationships and being too complex for other approaches [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . We apply NN forecasting to define a security feature that is unique and dynamic for every cardholder. This approach meets the most demanding requirements for security over a long period of time.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview and a comparison of prepaid cards and their security levels. Our proposed approach to security is described in Section 3. Section 4 focuses on the NN forecasting architecture, while Section 5 discusses the data analysis and the training of the NN forecasting networks. Section 6 presents the simulation results and the discussion of these results, and Section 7 addresses the conclusions.
for the OLPCs and the system. However, the CLPC cards are used by specific merchants and purchasers, and there is no widespread public examination, such as that of EMV or PCI SSC, to provide high-level security for the CLPCs and their applications. Only the security developed by the card manufacturer protects the card data. However, the manufacturers conceal their cryptographic algorithm and design to provide security. This is known as 'security by obscurity', but the details of this system will eventually become public information, which was the case for low-cost MIFARE RFID tags, DST RFID tags, and iButtons. Nevertheless, there are a great number of applications for these cards, each with its own security, and new applications can arise at any time because these cards are inexpensive.
Another important difference between the OLPCs and the CLPCs is the connection from the terminals to the backend system. The OLPCs are online systems, and their terminals must be connected online to their backend systems to complete the transactions. Therefore, the online systems are using fraud detection by monitoring card transactions and analyzing the data to detect unusual behavior. However, most CLPCs are offline systems, and their terminals are offline from their backend systems. Transactions are stored in the terminal unit they are transferred to the backend system. Therefore, the CLPCs are not as secure as the OLPCs. Our proposed neural network approach adds a different level of security to applications of low-cost RFID tags.
Recharge day forecasting
The CLPCs are only as secure as their card manufacturer's security. This is not enough for applications that use many low-cost prepaid cards, such as those that are used in public transportation. If the vulnerability in the card security becomes apparent, the barriers to adopt a new secure card technology or to evolve a countermeasure are significant and time-consuming because software and hardware must be redesigned. A criminal organization can develop a business case for illicit exploitation of the system.
To overcome the potential security vulnerabilities, we propose a completely different security mechanism that depends on the cardholder's behavioral characteristics [17] . Individuals have behavioral characteristics that differentiate them from other people [23, 24] . These distinct behavioral characteristics can be considered 'unique identifiers'. There are no rules that determine which behavioral characteristics define a unique identifier. Although there are many behavioral characteristics of a cardholder, we find three factors that serve as unique identifiers to characterize the relationship among daily use, the amount of recharge, and the elapsed day between recharges of the CLPC. This relationship is determined by trial-and-error method from 22,869 different cardholders during 3 years of use in public transportation systems in Turkey. With this relationship, we forecast the next recharge day and define an expiration date for a CLPC. Therefore, the cardholder must recharge his CLPC at a vending machine before the expiration date. Furthermore, we predict the cardholders' maximum daily use to provide a daily upper limit for use of the CLPC. With this security approach, it would be useless to clone the data of a CLPC.
Forecasting with neural networks
Forecasting is always subject to uncertainty from two sources: the model structure and the training data. It is necessary to identify an optimal combination from the set of input variables and the number of neurons in the hidden layer. Although there are different forecasting methods [25] , the basic approach is to train a NN with historical data containing both inputs and the corresponding desired outputs. In this process, a NN constructs an input-output mapping and adjusts the weights and the biases at each iteration based on the minimization of an error measure between the produced and the desired outputs. The adequate selection of inputs, hidden layers, training functions, tapped delay lines, and number of neurons strongly influences the success of the training process [26, 27] .
There are no guidelines for establishing an optimal configuration for an application. It is necessary to train different neural network models and choose the best option. Therefore, we use three types of multilayer perceptron (MLP)-based NN structures: the focused time delay neural network (FTDNN), the layer recurrent neural network (LRNN), and the nonlinear autoregressive neural network with external input (NARX). These MLPs have been used for many years in a wide range of applications, and there are many examples in the literature that explain the full mathematical treatment and structures of NNs and NN forecasting applications [19, [28] [29] [30] [31] . The MATLAB structure of the MLP used in this paper for forecasting the recharge time is given in the next section.
To identify the best forecasting result, different training functions and numbers of neurons are applied to the MLP. Each MLP consists of one input layer, one output layer, and a hidden layer with up to 30 neurons. The number of neurons in the hidden layer should be increased only when the results are not adequate. In our approach, one hidden layer produces excellent results, and there is no need to increase the size of the hidden layer. The tangent sigmoid function in the hidden layer and the linear function in the output layer are used as transfer functions. The following training functions are considered in the MLP: BFGS quasi-Newton (BFG), Bayesian regulation (BR), conjugate gradient with Powell/Beale restarts (CGB), Levenberg-Marquardt (LM), one-step secant (OSS), and scaled conjugate gradient (SCG).
Data analysis and training of the networks
The dataset used in this study comprises 3 years of data (2006-2008) for public transport with CLPCs. This dataset is obtained from 22,869 cardholders that belong to seven social groups (officials, workers, medics, high school students, undergraduate students, housewives, and retirees) in four different residential quarters in Turkey. The dataset consists of six input variables: the date, the day of the week, the time, the amount of daily use, the current balance per day, and the recharge amount. Figure 1 shows the current balance in Turkish lira (TL) per day of a CLPC used for public transportation by an official. The performance of a NN often deteriorates when the number of input variables increases. This has been referred to as the curse of dimensionality in the literature [26] . Increasing the number of input variables also leads to the need to use more training examples and process time to effectively understand the input-output relationship. Therefore, techniques such as principal component analysis or regression analysis are used to decrease the number of input variables without losing any features from the dataset. However, we use the trial-and-error method to decrease the number of input variables because our dataset is comprehensive. We find that when we recalculate the elapsed time between recharges of the CLPC and use it with the recharge amount as input (Figure 2) , the NN gives a very good forecast of the next recharge date. Therefore, three inputs (date of recharge, recharge amount, and elapsed days between the last recharge) and one output (forecast of the next recharge time) are used for every MLP. A large number of training processes are made with a NN, and two calculation methods are used to determine the most accurate forecast. The dataset is separated into two parts for the two different calculations. Figure 3 shows how the dataset is separated. All data points except the last data point (fresh data) are used for NN training. We investigate one-ahead forecasting, and, therefore, the last data point is evaluated separately. To implement the two calculation methods, the NN must be trained with the data. Therefore, data points used for NN training are divided into three parts: training (70%), validation (15%), and testing (15%). The dataset of 22,869 different cardholders involves approximately 80 data points for each cardholder, depending on their recharge times from January 2006 to December 2008. After the NN training, the resulting structure of the NN is used to predicting the training data and forecast the fresh data. These results are compared with the actual data points to determine the accuracy of the NN training. The first calculation method is the forecasting error analysis of one-ahead forecasting. The forecasting error analysis is calculated with four different functions. These functions are the relative error (RE), the forecast error (FE), the absolute error (AE), and the standard deviation (SD).
Here, y andŷ represent the actual and the forecasted (one-ahead forecasting or recharge day forecasting) values of the fresh data (Figure 3 ), respectively.F E indicates the average value of the one-ahead forecasting, and n represents the total number of cardholders. The variation of the one-ahead forecasting is calculated as F E ± SD . To obtain a highly accurate forecast of the recharge day, RE, FE, AE, and SD should be as small as possible.
The second calculation method is the prediction performance analysis of the NN training, and it is evaluated using the following functions: the root mean square error (RMSE), the mean absolute difference 
RM SE=
Here, x andx represent the actual and the predicted values, respectively, and m is the total number of data points in the training dataset ( Figure 3 ).
In this research, each MLP is simulated with MATLAB's NN toolbox, and the best NN forecasting configuration is determined by varying the training functions (BFG, BR, CGB, LM, OSS, and SCG) and the number of neurons (S = 3-30). These MLPs are FTDNN, LRNN, and NARX with three inputs (date of recharge, recharge amount, and elapsed days since the last recharge) and one output (forecasting of the next recharge date). The best NN forecasting configuration is based upon minimizing the difference between the MLP forecasted value and the desired output. To avoid local minima far from the global minimum, each MLP is trained 20 times using different random initialization parameters. Therefore, the result for each neuron is the average of 20 different training processes. The training process of the MLP is stopped when either the default level of error or the default number of iterations is achieved.
Simulation results
In the present study, three basic steps are taken to determine the best MLP architecture due to the timeconsuming MLP calculations, especially for the LRNN. In steps 1 and 2, the best architecture of each MLP is investigated. Finally, in step 3, these architectures are compared to define the best one.
First, to find the best training and prediction performance function, 100 cardholders are chosen randomly. Each training function is simulated 28 times for every cardholder because there are 28 neurons (S = 3-30) in the hidden layer. However, within these 28 results, only the best forecasting result is used, and the average from 100 cardholders is compared for every training function as shown in Tables 1-3. The best results are shown in bold. The smallest variation of the recharge day forecasting error (F E ±SD) is obtained with the LRNN and the SCG training function. However, if we compare it with the NARX and the LM training function, we see that the results are actually the same. Certainly, the best training function must be selected according to the smallest value of the prediction performance functions (the value of r that is closest to 1). In an actual recharge application,RE ,ĀE , andF E±SD are unknown, and the one-ahead forecasting result is determined only from the smallest value of the prediction performance function. The training functions and their corresponding best prediction performance functions are summarized in Table 4 . Furthermore, only the NARX and the FTDNN with the LM training function give the best forecasting error function results with two different prediction performance functions (Tables 1 and 3 ). Although none of the LRNN prediction performance functions give the best forecasting error function result, they are comparable to the FTDNN and the NARX. However, the average calculation time of the training process for each training function with the LRNN is extremely high ( Table 5) .
Therefore, the LRNN could not be used in an actual recharge application (vending machine or recharge point), even if it had a better forecasting error function result. We use five computers with four different configurations (Intel i7 1.86 GHz, Intel i5 1.86 GHz, Intel Core 2 Duo 1.86 GHz, and two Intel Core 2 Duo 1.86 GHz PCs with 4.0 GB of RAM) for this and the following steps. Second, in order to determine the optimal number of neurons for the training function from step 1, another 100 cardholders are chosen randomly. After the forecasting error function, neurons that provide AE values below 3 are selected for each cardholder, and equal numbers of neurons from the 100 cardholders are grouped together. An upper limit of 3 for AE means a recharge day forecasting error within 3 days, which is good enough for use in public transportation applications. Furthermore, this entails the optimal range of neurons to make an acceptable selection for the next step. Increasing the number of neurons also increases AE, except for the LRNN with the CGB training function. Increasing the number of neurons in the hidden layer increases the power of the network at the expense of the computation time. Furthermore, it is more likely to produce over-fitting where the NN fits all of the training data but memorizes the training data instead of learning to adapt itself to new situations. Therefore, only neurons from Table 6 for the FTDNN, the LRNN, and the NARX are used in the next step, which provides better forecasting among the neurons. Table 7 shows the variation of the recharge day forecasting error performance for each MLP and its training function. The worst average calculation time for a cardholder is obtained again with the LRNN.
If we compare the RE and the AE (Table 7) with the values from the first step (Tables 1-3) , only RE decreases significantly. Table 8 presents these decreases that depend on the number of elapsed days since the last recharge by the cardholder. According to these results in Table 8 , only the AE is suitable for the accuracy of the recharge day forecasting. In steps 1 and 2, the best architectures for each MLP are determined. Finally, to determine the best MLP, another 500 randomly chosen cardholders are used. These results are processed on the basis of the prediction performance functions as explained in step 1. Table 4 summarizes the results of step 1 and shows the best predictions achieved with the MLPs, the training functions, and the prediction performance functions. These results show, for example, that the FTDNN with the CGB training function gives good predictions with the RMSE (FTDNN-CGB-RMSE) or the MAD (FTDNN-CGB-MAD) prediction performance function.
Furthermore, the FTDNN with the LM training function also gives good predictions when the MAPE (FTDNN-LM-MAPE) or the r (FTDNN-LM-r) prediction performance function is used. However, combinations of the FTDNN with the other training and prediction performance functions do not provide better prediction results. In this step, therefore, simulations are made with the FTDNN and the LRNN with two training functions and the NARX with three training functions. Therefore, every cardholder is simulated seven times. In step 2, these training functions and up to 30 neurons are investigated, and the best predictions are achieved with five neurons (Table 6) . Therefore, there are 35 (7 × 5) different results for every cardholder, 10 with the FTDNN and the LRNN, and 15 with the NARX. For example, Table 9 shows the NARX results for a cardholder. This table is shown as an Excel sheet to explain step 3. These results are obtained with the CGB-the RMSE (rows 2-6), the SCG-MAPE (rows 7-11), the LM-MAD (rows [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] , and the LM-r (rows [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . However, to compare the MLP and the training functions, the best value from every prediction performance function is used to determine the best MLP. The smallest RMSE value in rows 2-6 (NARX-CGB-RMSE) is in cell B-4, and row 4 is selected.
For the MAPE, the smallest value in rows 7-11 (NARX-SCG-MAPE) is in cell C-11, and row 11 is selected.
For the MAD, the smallest value in rows 12-16 (NARX-LM-MAD) is in cell D-12, and row 12 is taken. Finally, for r, the highest value in rows 12-16 (NARX-LM-r) is in cell E-13, and row 13 is taken. Thus, there are only four results for every cardholder, each one obtained from different prediction performance functions' best value. These procedures are repeated for every 500 cardholders, and the average values are shown in Table 10 . The NARX with the LM training function and the MAD prediction performance function gives the best one-ahead forecast, and it is also the fastest technique, whereas LRNN is again the slowest method. The subsequent results presented in this paper are obtained using the NARX with the LM training function and the MAD prediction performance function. We use 38 computers with two different configurations (AMD Phenom 2.30 GHz and Intel Core 2 Duo 3.00 GHz PCs with 2.0 GB of RAM) for this step and the following section. After determining the best MLP and its training function, its prediction performance function, and the optimum number of neurons, the remaining 22,169 cardholders are investigated and validated. Table 11 shows that for over 90% of the cardholders, the recharged day forecasting error is less than 3 days. Detailed distributions of the recharge day forecasting error with occupations are shown in Table 12 . These results show that our approach is capable of successfully forecasting the uncertain irregular recharge days of cardholders, such as housewives, undergraduate students, and retirees. 
Conclusions and future work
We propose a novel NN forecasting approach to prevent counterfeiting and cloning for closed-loop prepaid cards based on RFID or 1-Wire technology without an online backend system. Other researchers have shown that it is possible to clone or emulate high-security cards with 3DES or AES cryptographic protocols and factoryprogrammed UID. Furthermore, other researchers have shown that there are security weaknesses in online backend systems with high security cards. The main reason for these weaknesses is their security concept, where the security key and the UID are individual and specific but nonchangeable for each card. The whole security protocol is the same for every user. Although our proposed security approach does not modify or improve the existing protocol of the RFID system, it proposes another level of security that is individual, specific, and dynamic for each user. This is archived by defining an expiration date for each card according to the cardholders' recharge day and behavioral characteristics with NN forecasting. Simulation results show that this evolved NN forecasting configuration can successfully predict the next recharge time. For over 90% of the cardholders, the recharge days are forecast with a deviation of less than 3 days, which is a great performance for use in public transportation systems.
In this paper, we show that the behavioral characteristics of cardholders can be used with NN forecasting to define security levels that are individual, personal, and dynamic. Therefore, the implementation of our proposed security approach in existing RFID applications with low-cost tags is suggested. With our security approach, cloning a card would be useless, and in the worst-case scenario, a cloned card could only be used until its expiration date. Although a simple maximum daily use of a card is defined (the recharge amount divided by the predicted next recharge time), a more precise definition of the maximum daily use for every weekday should be investigated with NN forecasting as a second behavior characteristic of cardholders as a future work. If the upper limit of daily use is reached, then the cardholder must show his/her card to the bus driver before they can use public transportation. Genuine cards bear holograms or stamps from the public transport authority. Therefore, cloned cards could only be used once a day until the expiration date. In future work, other behavior characteristics of cardholders should be investigated to prevent the daily use until the expiration date.
